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Introduction
In the last few years there have been several studies of the contribution of computers to output. Lau and Tokutsu (1992) investigated this issue at the aggregate level using U.S. annual time-series data for the period 1960-90. Berndt, Morrison, and Rosenblum (1992) , Morrison and Berndt (1991) , and Siegel and Griliches (1992) studied it at the industry level. We are familiar with only one major firm-level study, by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993) . Two of the industry-level studies concluded that computers have had a negative influence on productivity. Berndt, Morrison, and Rosenblum (1992) constructed an estimate of the ratio of an industry's "high-tech" capital stock (consisting of computers, communication equipment, scientific instruments, and photocopy equipment) to its total capital stock for 2-digit manufacturing industries for the period 1968-86. They found that changes in this ratio were negatively correlated with labor productivity growth. Using similar data but a different methodology, Morrison and Berndt (1991) concluded that "in 1986, estimated marginal benefits of investments in ["high-tech" office and information technology equipment] are less than marginal costs, implying over investment in" this capital in 1986.
The other studies have reached the opposite conclusion. Lan and Tokutsu (1992) found that "computer technology has made a very significant contribution to the growth of aggregate real output in the U.S. economy during the past three decades.
In fact, approximately 50 percent of the growth of aggregate real output during this period can be attributed to the growth in computer capital" (p. 25). Siegel and Griliches (1992, p. 456) found a strong "positive correlation between productivity growth (but not acceleration in productivity) and investment in computers." Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993) also conclude that computers "have made a substantial and significantly significant contribution to output."1 All of these studies have been useful, and have increased our understanding of the role of computers in production, but they are subject to various limitations. For example, 1982 was the last year of the period analyzed by Siegel and Griliches; according to Baily and Gordon (1988, p. 390) this preceded the 1 Because economists believe that an employee's wage is positively correlated with his or her productivity, estimates of the relationship between computer use and wage rates may provide indirect evidence about the productivity impact of computers.
These estimates also suggest that the productivity impact has been positive. Using data from the Current Population Survey and the High School and Beyond Survey, Krueger found (1993, p. 33 ) that "workers who use computers on their job earn 10 to 15 percent higher wages. " Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1993) also found strong positive correlations between skill upgrading and increased investment in computers within industries. era of great diffusion of computers.2 The industry-level studies were based on the manufacturing sector; as Baily and Gordon (1988, p. 389 ) point out, "the manufacturing sector is not a big owner of the electronic equipment it produces." The studies that have found that computer investment yields positive returns have not provided valid tests of the (stronger) hypothesis that computer investment (like R&D investment) yields excess returns--returns greater than those earned by other factors. In addition, although labor costs account for over 40% of information systems (IS) budgets, only one previous study has examined the role of IS labor as well as 115 capital.
In this paper we examine the output contributions of both IS capital and IS labor at the firm level during the period 1988-91 throughout the business sector, using two different sources of data on these inputs: Informationweek magazine and Computerworid magazine. The use of two independent data sources allows us to explore the reliability of the data on IS budgets, capital and labor.
In Section 2 we postulate a production function that 2 IBaily and Gordon show that computers and communication equipment as a percent of total non-residential capital employed in nonmanufacturing increased from 4.4% in 1960-69 to 6.7% in 1970 -79 to 16.2% in 1987 . Similarly, Krueger (1993 reports that the percent of workers who directly use a computer at work increased from 24.6% in 1984 to 37.4% in 1989.
incorporates IS capital (and labor) in addition to non-IS inputs, and discuss the restrictions imposed on the parameters of this function by several hypotheses. In Section 3 we review in greater detail the empirical results obtained by Lau and Tokutsu and by Brynjolfsson and Flitt. We describe our research design for estimating the production function in Section 4, and the data sources in Section 5. Summary statistics, including some basic facts about the allocation of information technology resources, are presented in Table 6 . Estimates of the production function and their interpretation are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 contains a summary and concluding remarks.
2. Incorporating computer capital (and labor) in the production function The major objective of this and previous studies in this area is to estimate (and test hypotheses about) the marginal product of computer capital, or a related parameter, the output elasticity of computer capital. Let us postulate the following production function : lnY=cx1lnK1+cr0InKo+fllnL (1) where Y = output, K1 computer capital stock, IC K -K1 = non-computer capital stock, K = total capital stock, and L = labor. There are at least two different ("null") hypotheses that one might want to test concerning &1. The first is H0: a S 0 against the alternative that a1 > 0. In other words, one could test whether or not the output elasticity (and marginal product) of computer capital is positive. The second null hypothesis is that MP1 / MI'0 S R1 I R0: the ratio of the marginal products of computer and non-computer capital is less than the ratio of their rental prices (R the rental price of asset i). This hypothesis can be expressed in the form H0: a1-(R, K1/R0K0)cy0cO (2) Since the second term on the left-hand-side of eq. (2) is positive, rejection of this hypothesis is "stronger" than rejection of the first hypothesis. Rejection of it implies not just that there are positive returns to computer investment, but that there are xcess returns to computer investment.
Much previous research has shown that capital (and labor) employed in research and development (R&D) activities has a higher marginal product than other capital employed by the firm: there appear to be "excess" private returns to R&D investment.
Rejection of the hypothesis represented by eq. (2) would imply that like R&D expenditure, IS expenditure yields excess returns.
As Lau and Tokutsu (1992) other capital, and the purchase price of computers has declined rapidly, whereas the purchase price of other capital has increased. Hence r1 = .42, r0 = .07, (r1 / r0) = 6, and eq. (4) becomes H0:a1-6(P1K1/P0K0)a0>0
(5) Lau and Tokutsu (1992) and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993) In Y = a1 ln K1 + a0ln K0 + In L1 + j30 ln L0 (6) where L1 = the number of computer (IS) employees, and L, L -= the number of other employees.
There axe two hypotheses that one might want to test about 13. The first is that the ratio of the marginal product to the wage rate is higher for IS employees than it is for other employees; this may be expressed as (7) where W, (i = 0, 1) = the wage rate of type i employees. The second hypothesis is that the ratio of computer labor to computer capital output elasticities is equal to the ratio of their shares in the IS budget:
3. Previous research Lau and Tokutsu (1992) Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993) examined the role of IS labor as well as IS capital in production using longitudinal data on several hundred large American companies for the period 1987-91. They estimated production functions using the following specification and variable definitions: ln Y = a1 in K1 + a0 in K0 + b1 in (W1 L1) + b0ln(COGS-W1L) (9) where COGS = cost of goods sold (total labor, materials, and other nonrinterest expenses).. Their measure of computer labor was W1 L (IS budget labor expense) rather than the number of IS employees L1, perhaps because L1 was available only in a single year (1990) . Our data suggest that there is substantial variation in this sample in the implicit annual wage rate of IS employees (W,): it ranges from about $9000 to $135,000.
Although some of this variation may reflect differences in labor quality, skill, and hours of work, it may also reflect substantial measurement error. We will use IS employment rather than the IS wage bill as our measure of computer labor. Because the last regressor in eq. (9) in R,, = a1 in K1,1, + a0 in
Under these assumptions, the coefficients from the real-valueadded production function (11) may be identified from a grossrevenue regression that includes industry and year dummies.
An obvious advantage of this cross-sectional, withinindustry research design is that it enables us to finesse the extremely difficult--particularly in the service sector--problem of price (and real output) measurement.4 Our procedure does not
Inclusion of a complete set of industry/year interaction effects would consume too many degrees of freedom.
See Lichtenberg and Griliches (1989) , and (3riliches (1992 As noted earlier, the noncomputer capital stock is defined as the total capital stock minus the computer capital stock: '0 K -K1. We defined K as the book value of total net property, plant, and equipment: the (historic) cost of tangible fixed property used in the production of res'enue, less accumulated depreciation (annual data item #8 in the Compustat Industrial File). This is an imperfect measure of capital for two reasons:
it is based on historic rather than replacement cost (i.e. it fails to account for changes in asset prices), and on accounting rather than economic depreciation. To the extent that the ratio of historic to replacement cost and the ratio of accounting to economic depreciation are constant across firms within industries and years, however, inclusion of the industry and year dummies will eliminate biases arising from this definition of K (hence K3).
Non computer labor input (L0) was defined as total employment (L) minus the number of IS employees.
Computerworld survey data were available for the years The mean number of IS employees was 1121 in 1993, also down about 10 percent from the 1990 figure. However total employment declined less than IS employment, so that weightedaverage (L1 / L) declined from 3.3% to 2.9%, The fact that the weighted average value of (L1 / L) is always lower than the unweighted average indicates that (L1 / L) tends to be inversely related to total employment. This might be a reflection of economies of scale.
In 1992 Informationweek for the first time published IS spending and capital value data for the top 50 (ranked by value of IS capital) European companies. IS spending and capital value of these firms appears to be much greater than those of the top 50 American firms. The unweighted mean ratio of IS expenditure to sales was 3.7% for Europe and 2.2 % for the U.S.; the t-statistic on this difference was 2.1 (p-value .04). Moreover, the value of the IS capital employed by each of the 50 European firms was over $400 m., whereas only 11 of the U.S. companies had JS capital whose value was at least $250 million.
On avenge during the sample period, then, the number of IS employees was about 3.2% as large as the number of other employees. To perform the appropriate hypothesis tests, we need to multiply this ratio by the ratio of IS to non-IS employee wage rates (W1 / W0), to obtain an estimate of relative (IS to non-IS) labor costs. In 1990, the average annual earnings of all privatesector workers (a weighted average of W1 and W0) was $17,994.6 The Computerworld data indicate that in 1990, iS labor cost per employee was $56,091. This is likely to be an overestimate of WI, since it includes fringe benefits. (According to the National Science Foundation, the average annual salary in 1986--the most recent year for which data are available--of "computer specialists employed in industry" was $37,900.)
Adopting this estimate implies that W0 = $16,735, W1 / W0 = 3.35, and L W1 I L0 W0 = 10.7%. The ratio of IS to non-IS labor costs is no more than 10.7%, and probably less. To perform hypothesis tests, we assume that the ratio is 10%, which is probably too high, so that our tests are likely to be conservative (we are less likely to reject the null hypothesis that relative marginal productivity equals relative wages).
Summary statistics based on the Computerworld data are reported in Table 2 During the period 1988-91, computer capital accounted for about 1.8% of the value of the total capital stock, which implies that P1 K1 / P0 lC = .018. As discussed earlier, to obtain the rental value ratio (R1 K1 7 R0 }Q) we need to multiply this asset value ratio by r1 / r0, where r1 (i = 0, 1) is the ratio of asset i's rental price to its asset price. Lau and Tokutsu's analysis suggested that r1 / r0 = 6, which implies that R1 K1 / R0 1( 10.8%.
An estimate of the average ratio of investment in computers to total investment may perhaps serve as a check on the validity of this constructed rental value ratio.
Imagine that an economy is in a steady state (zero net investment) and that the prices of output and assets are
Moreover, given these assumptions and reasonable parameter values, (r1 / r0) (b / ô), so that (I I I) (r1 / r0) (K1 / K0).7
One would expect the relative rates of investment to be roughly equal to (slightly larger than) the relative rental values. The last column of Table 2 shows weighted (by total investment) avenge overstates actual computer equipment purchases since it may include purchases of software and lease payments. The avenge value of (I / I) during 1988-9 1 was about 13% (implying a mean value of I / I of 15%), which suggests that our estimate of 10.8% of the rental value ratio is not unreasonable.
The Informationweek and Computerworid data are examined simultaneously, for a set of "matched observations"
(observations for which data were available from both sources)
With zero expected asset price changes, (r1 / r0) = (R + b) I (R + 4%). With zero inflation, the nominal interest rate R is equal to the real interest rate, whose long-mn average value is perhaps .02. When ô, = .20 and 4% = .05, (r / r0) = .22 / .07 = 3.14, which is not that far from (S1 / 4%) = 4.
s The mean values of these fractions are about 40% and 3%, respectively.
in Tables 3 and 4. The first table reports 
Correlation coefficients between Inlormationweek and
Computerworid estimates of IS budget, labor, and capital--both levels and shares (of sales, total employment, and total assets, respectively)--are reported in Table 4 . The correlation between the two IS budget estimates tends to be quite high: it ranges between .85 and .94. The correlation between the two estimated ratios of IS budget to sales is lower, ranging from .59 to .74. In the case of IS employment, the pattern is similar, although the correlations are higher: the correlation between L1 values is .91 -There is also a suspicious jump in the mean value of the Computerworid K1 value in 1991. Since our production function model includes year dummies, large changes in the annual means per se will not affect our estimates.
.96, and between (L1 / L) ratios is .84. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the correlation between alternative K1 values is much lower than the correlation between alternative ISI3UD and L1 values: the mean and median K1 correlations are both about .55.
This suggests that estimates of the value of computer capital are less reliable than estimates of the IS budget and of IS employment.
Empirical results
Estimates of variants of the production function (12) are presented in Table 5 . The first line of the table reports a "baseline" regression in which neither capital nor labor is disaggregated into IS-and non-IS components. The coefficients on both total capital and total labor are reasonably well behaved, although their sum (.93) is significantly less than one (suggesting decreasing returns to scale) and the ratio of the capital to the labor coefficient is somewhat larger than one might expect on the basis of relative factor shares. In the next three regressions capital, but not labor, is disaggregated into IS and non-IS components, using the Computerworid estimates, the Informationweek estimates, and an avenge of the two estimates (when both were available), respectively. In the regression based on Computerworld data on line (2), the coefficient on computer capital is positive, large (.100) and highly significant (t = 10.8). This indicates that we can easily reject the hypothesis that the marginal product of computer capital (or the rate of return on investment in computers) is zero. To test the hypothesis that the rate of return on computer investment is equal to the rate of return on other investment, we use the statistic (a1 -. 08 a0 j3 is more than twice as large as the value implied by that hypothesis. The estimates based on an average of both sources of data on IS employment, reported in line (7), are very similar to the estimates in the preceding line.
In the last three regressions, both capital and labor are separated into IS and non-IS components. Comparison of eqs. is the same--about .21--as in eq. (9), but this eq. assigns more "weight" (and excess returns) to K1, and less to L1, than eq.
(9). hI This equation suggests that the computer capital elasticity is over four times as large as one would expect in the absence of excess returns; the computer labor elasticity is about twice as large, but this difference is only marginally significant.
The sum of the IS capital and labor elasticities perhaps provides the most obvious evidence for excess returns to IS expenditure. The last two equations both imply that computer capital and labor jointly contribute, or account for, about 21 percent of output (a1 + f31 = .21). Our earlier calculations indicated that only about 10% of both capital and labor income accrue to IS factors.
Loosely speaking, the finding that IS inputs earn excess returns suggests that small changes in IS spending result in large changes in output and productivity. A model developed in a recent paper by Kremer (1993) We estimated production functions in which only capital was disaggregated into IS and non-IS components, only labor was disaggregated, and both inputs were disaggregated. Noise in the computer capital data notwithstanding, the hypothesis of zero returns to computer capital was always decisively rejected by the data. In fact, the estimates indicated that there are substantial "excess returns" to investment in computer capital: its elasticity was 2.6 -3.7 times as large as we would expect to observe if there were zero excess returns (i.e., if the marginal rate of substitution between IS and non-IS capital were equal to the ratio of their rental rates). 
